Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimate Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



February 2010

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I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

Defense	FY 2009	Price	Program	FY 2010	Price	Program	FY 2011
Threat	Actuals	Change	<u>Change</u>	Estimate	<u>Change</u>	<u>Change</u>	Estimate
Reduction Agency	433,244	4,766	-14,450	423,560	5,930	93,022	522,512

CTR did not receive FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental or Bridge funding.

- I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise, including provision of the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems and related infrastructure. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The Department of Defense (DoD) has:
 - Expanded the strategic focus of the CTR Program to support the new "National Strategy to Counter Biological Threats" and the President's effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material;
 - Increased Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) activities to consolidate and secure pathogens and to build threat agent detection and response (TADR) systems that provide early warning of a bio-attack;
 - Established a program in coordination with other Federal agencies to enable non-Russian Former Soviet Union (FSU) states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders. Other agencies include:
 - o Department of State (DoS),

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

- o Department of Energy (DoE), and
- o Department of Homeland Security including the U.S. Coast Guard; and
- Expanded the CTR Program outside the FSU as called for in the FY 2008 NDAA.

The CTR Program is partnering with willing countries to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials, technology, and expertise. While legacy efforts in the FSU remain important, including elimination of associated delivery systems and related infrastructure in Russia, CTR is being redefined to address emerging security realities and urgent threats in other regions of the world. The CTR program supports the President's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material and the new "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats" which call for action against these realities and threats. The first priority action remains to secure or confine WMD at the source whether through destruction, improved security or early detection and response. Unlike nuclear or chemical threats, biological threats may derive from either nature or deliberate/inadvertent release. Since especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) are able to infect persons/animals and spread quickly, early detection and response is critical to preventing pandemics and the potential for significant lose of life and economic impact. Countering this threat requires a system to detect, diagnose and report disease outbreaks quickly and reliably.

The Biological Threat Reduction program partners with willing countries to provide safe and secure EDP storage and research and builds accurate detection, diagnostic and reporting capability. In close coordination with DoE, CTR is improving the border control capabilities of non-Russian FSU states through the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative. CTR facilitates defense and military contacts to build relationships in new

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

regions. A new program area, Global Nuclear Lockdown, has been established to track DoD's support for the President's effort to secure all vulnerable weapons usable nuclear materials. Guidelines are in place to enhance interagency planning and coordination.

To maximize effectiveness and efficiency, the CTR Program requires recipient state cooperation on common program objectives. Implementing Agreements with recipient states are required before a project can begin or enter a new phase and are written with an "up to" cost limit so that CTR Program resources are not irrevocably committed to an uncooperative recipient state. Each phase of a project has exit criteria, many of which are tied to the recipient state's cooperation. If the project phase's exit criteria are not met, DoD can terminate a project. Additionally, all project acquisition strategies take into account the possibility that the recipient state's objectives or level of cooperation may change. This flexibility in CTR program management enables DoD to target resources on the most cooperative partner countries. If a recipient state is not cooperative in developing, implementing, or absorbing a CTR threat reduction project, the law permits the CTR Program to shift resources to another high priority partner state or CTR Program upon notification to Congress. This approach ensures that the CTR long-term goal of minimizing WMD threats is maintained even when resources are directed to another country or project.

The CTR Program objectives and related assistance activities are:

A. <u>Dismantle threat WMD associated infrastructure</u>:

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program,

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

seeks to reduce this threat by providing assistance to dismantle WMD and associated delivery systems and infrastructure.

The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia to dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers and road-mobile ICBM launchers; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and the associated strategic nuclear submarine; Spent Naval Fuel Disposition; and WMD infrastructure. DoD also assists Ukraine to store and eliminate ICBM rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.

As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons. The U.S. and other Group of Eight countries funded construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) near Planovy for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. Since CW destruction operations began in March 2009, DoD is funding technical support of CWDF and other CWD activities with FY 2009 and prior year funds. The Planovy chemical weapons storage facility contains approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions (estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles).

B. Consolidate and secure threat WMD and related technology and materials:

The CTR Program encourages nuclear warhead dismantlement and provides enhanced security for strategic, non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, and provides sustainment for 5 rail transfer points, and shares the costs at 19 of the 24 nuclear weapons storage areas throughout Russia. The CTR Program assists in the secure transport of an estimated 1,500 nuclear warheads per year to dismantlement or secures storage facilities and continues to procure new nuclear weapons transport railcars with security and monitoring systems to

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

support this effort. The CTR Program coordinates closely with the DoE Materials Protection, Control and Accounting assistance program.

The CTR Program consolidates dangerous viral and bacterial pathogens into safe and secure central reference laboratories or central repositories and enhances threat agent detection and response systems to provide early warning of biological outbreaks. This assistance helps prevent the theft, diversion, or accidental release of dangerous biological pathogens and strengthens DoD's ability to detect and diagnose outbreaks. Additionally, CTR Program assistance determines the causes of these outbreaks (natural or terrorist); provides access to real-time, unfiltered medical information; consolidates pathogen collections into central laboratories; modernizes diagnostic capabilities; and develops a network of trained, ethical recipient state scientists equipped to respond to and contain a biological release.

C. Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct:

Cooperative biological research (CBR) projects primarily focus on mapping locations of especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) and identify the transmittal vectors. This program permits increased transparency at biological research facilities. The research projects enhance epidemiological and diagnostic capacity and advance DoD's understanding of endemic EDPs. The CTR Program secures the transfer of dangerous pathogens to the U.S. to improve diagnostics and therapeutics and for force health protection and forensics reference. This program encourages higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct by scientists and gains transparency into research laboratories that work with especially dangerous pathogens. Due to the Russian government's unwillingness to cooperate on human biological threat reduction and without a bilateral agreement for such cooperation, DoD

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

has refocused its engagement in Russia to partner with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Ministry of Agriculture.

D. Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation:

The WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner countries to detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across state borders. DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support, and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities that prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and related materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. DoD is currently pursuing proliferation prevention projects in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The WMD-PPI program coordinates with the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs in non-Russian FSU states.

The CTR Program also supports expanded contacts between defense establishments to support relationship building opportunities. Future events will be expanded to support the advanced mission of the CTR Program as directed in the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.

The New Initiatives program was established with additional funding in the FY 2008/2009/2010 Defense Appropriations Acts and DoD completed an assessment of where CTR assistance would best support the effort to counter the threat from WMD transiting or in potential partner countries. Potential nuclear, chemical and biological threats were assessed. Pakistan, Afghanistan and select countries in Asia and Africa have been identified as high priority partners. Based on the countries' willingness to partner,

I. Description of Operations Financed (Continued):

DoD will conduct BTR assessments and projects, which will identify existing capabilities and constraints relative to BTR requirements. As part of the President's effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material, some of these funds may be used to provide nuclear security "best practices" to countries/regions outside the FSU.

E. Other program support:

Other Assessments/Administrative Support funds the Audit and Examination (A&E) program provided for in the CTR agreements with recipient states and overall program management and administration costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure that DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Other activities include CTR Program travel, translator/interpreter support, agency support services, and administrative and advisory support. CTR Program personnel assigned to Embassy offices in six FSU countries also are supported with these funds.

Program management and support costs are funded by the individual CTR Program areas and include contract logistic support, contract transportation support, administrative and advisory support, and travel.

II. Force Structure Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

DoD assists Russia with equipment and services and oversees destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems in accordance with the SOAE Implementing Agreement and relevant arms control agreements. Although Russia has taken responsibility for many associated costs, such as transportation, the DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ICBM silo launchers, ICBM road-mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, and some WMD infrastructure.

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination

This project eliminates SS-25 and SS-N-20 solid propellant missile systems. Activities include a fee for service at Russian missile disassembly and elimination facilities and mobile launcher elimination facilities, and transportation of SS-25 missiles and solid rocket motors in and out of a temporary storage facility.

<u>Liquid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile/Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</u> and Silo Elimination

This project deactivates, dismantles, and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos and destroys SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs.

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement

This project eliminates SLBM launchers from *Delta* class and *Typhoon* class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and provides the infrastructure required to defuel the SSBNs. The launcher section is eliminated, the reactor section removed, and with Canadian assistance the spent naval fuel placed in casks for long-term storage.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

B. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination:

One active project assists Ukraine to store and eliminate SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRMs) from dismantled ICBMs.

C. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

This program supports the Agreement with Russia for the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons and prevents the proliferation of chemical weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups. Using the experience from program efforts in Russia, this program is able to support emerging CWD requirements.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

This project provides technical support with FY 2009 and prior year funds for the CWDF as it destroys chemical weapons and other CWD activities in Russia.

D. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken with Russia pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Implementing Agreement.

Site Security Enhancements

This project improves security and safety at Russia's MOD nuclear weapons storage sites. These sites include both national stockpile and operational storage sites of the Russian Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces and temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DoD and DoE have worked closely with the MOD to provide comprehensive security enhancements. DoD, DoE and MOD-R are sustaining this installed

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

equipment at required levels during a transition period until MOD-R builds a cadre of expertise and assumes full responsibility.

Security Assessment and Training Center

This project expands the existing DoD-provided SATC facility at Abramovo Base to serve as a regional training and sustainment center. The SATC expansion will complement the Far East Training Center (FETC) and the DoE provided Kola and Siberian Technical Centers to provide training, depot-level maintenance and repair, and spare parts storage for all branches of MOD-R involved with WMD security and sustainment of nuclear weapons storage sites distributed across Russia. Specifically the project will provide a classroom building, student dormitory, maintenance and repair workshop, warehouse, garage, and associated equipment for MOD-R.

E. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security:

These CTR Program activities are undertaken with Russia pursuant to the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Implementing Agreement. This program supports U.S. proliferation prevention objectives by enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment and provides railcar maintenance and procurement.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation

This project assists Russia to transport nuclear warheads safely and securely to storage and dismantlement facilities.

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement

This project supports the certification of a required set of MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars through preventive and depot maintenance and production of up to 100

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

safe and secure weapons transport cars with security and monitoring systems. Russia will eliminate two older weapons transport cars for each new transport car provided.

II. <u>Force Structure Summary</u> (Continued):

F. Biological Threat Reduction:

This program with partner countries provides assistance to secure and consolidate collections of especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) and their associated research into a minimum number of secure health and agricultural laboratories or related facilities; enhances partner country/region's capability to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of biological weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise by improving biological safety and security (BS&S) standards and procedures; enhances partner country/region's capability to detect, diagnose, and report endemic and epidemic, man-made or natural EDPs, bioterror attacks, and potential pandemics; and ensures the developed capabilities are designed to be sustainable within each partner country/region's current operating budget.

Biosecurity and Biosafety and Threat Agent Detection and Response

This project consolidates and secures a partner country/region's dangerous pathogen collections into safe, centralized facilities to prevent unauthorized acquisition of biological weapons materials. The project improves biosafety and biosecurity; enhances partner country/region's capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics; and ensures the safe and secure storage and handling of especially dangerous pathogens used for peaceful research to prevent accidental release, theft, and exposure. DoD, with partner countries and other U.S. Government departments, is developing a network of disease monitoring and diagnostic centers with trained staff throughout each country linked to a safe, secure centralized laboratory and pathogen/data repository. It is envisioned that these individual country networks will be linked with regional partners to enhance disease surveillance, reporting, and containment and ensure early warning of potential bioattacks. The DoD created training modules to elevate the diagnostic and epidemiological capabilities of the scientific and technical staff and to

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

promote bioethics, nonproliferation, biological safety, and biological security to ensure sustainment, effectiveness of program investment, and strategic relevance. This project promotes sustained transparency and the formation of strategic health partnerships in the war on bioterrorism.

Cooperative Biological Research

This project increases transparency, improves scientists' standards of conduct, and leverages the extensive expertise of former Soviet biological weapons scientists and epidemiologists to address DoD's bio-defense needs in force protection, medical countermeasures, counter-terrorism, and disease surveillance. U.S. researchers are currently collaborating with former Soviet biological weapons research institutes, working with counterparts on DoD/interagency projects. Using New Initiative funds this program also will begin projects with scientists outside the FSU.

G. Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

This program enhances the capability of partner countries to detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD or related materials. Equipment, infrastructure, and operations and maintenance training will be provided to border guards, customs officials, and MOD military for defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. The DoD assistance will complement ongoing counter-proliferation assistance provided by the DoE Second Line of Defense, the DoS Export Control and Related Border Security programs, and the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program.

Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Ukraine)

This project assists development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Moldovan and other land borders, Ukraine's

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

maritime border, adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and key seaports. Ukraine will achieve these capabilities by improving WMD detection, surveillance, interdiction, communications/data storage, training, maintenance, and sustainment. The land border project is closely coordinated with DoE's Second Line of Defense effort to place portal monitors at the ports of entry.

Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention (Azerbaijan)

This project supports development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials along Azerbaijan's maritime border on the Caspian Sea. It provides maritime surveillance equipment and procedures; repair and upgrade of existing vessels; equipment for boarding crews, including devices to detect WMD; the construction, repair, and upgrade of command and control, maintenance, and logistics facilities; and the construction of an operating location along the Azerbaijan southern coast to improve the on-station time and expand the patrol areas of the State Border Service - Coast Guard.

Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (Kazakhstan) This project secures radiological materials.

Expanded Proliferation Prevention

Enhance the WMD detection and interdiction capabilities of other partner countries and conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts.

H. Global Nuclear Lockdown:

This new program supports the President's goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within 4 years and to sustain upgrades and transition enduring responsibilities to

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

respective countries by 2014. The CTR program will seek a determination for specific countries and, working with DoE and the Interagency, plans to establish Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security. The purpose of these regional centers, which are not located at material or weapons storage sites, will be to assess equipment and manpower, provide material security training, and demonstrate enhanced security procedures and processes. The centers would provide lessons learned without direct site access. Additionally, ongoing nuclear security and non-proliferation efforts in Russia and Kazakhstan will continue.

I. Defense and Military Contacts:

This project improves cooperation between the U.S. and foreign military establishments through increased bilateral contacts such as high-level visits and specialists' exchanges between DoD and the respective Ministry of Defense (MOD). These bilateral activities have engaged military and defense officials to promote demilitarization of excess infrastructure, defense reform and further counter-proliferation efforts. The FY 2010 and FY 2011 funds will be used to support specific relationship-building opportunities in new geographic areas.

J. New Initiatives:

This program will expand the CTR WMD proliferation prevention efforts outside of the FSU. This program also will begin cooperative biological research projects with scientists outside the FSU.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

K. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project enables the U.S. Government to examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for the intended purposes of the CTR Program.

Program Management/Administration

This project provides program administrative and general support costs, project development costs, an advisory and assistance services contract, Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel. This project funds six permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Embassy offices (DTROs) in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

II. Force Structure Summary (Continued):

Program	Project	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011
Strategic (Offensive Arms Elimination	\$38,985 \$66,385		\$66,732
	Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination - Russia	\$15,451	\$27,267	\$34,880
	Liquid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Silo Elimination - Russia	\$13,495	\$13,063	\$20,756
	SLBM Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement - Russia	\$10,039	\$26,055	\$11,096
Strategic I	Nuclear Arms Elimination	\$6,400	\$6,800	\$6,800
	SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine	\$6,400	\$6,800	\$6,800
Chemical	Weapons Destruction	\$28,000	\$3,000	\$3,000
	Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility - Russia	\$26,000	\$2,000	
	Chemical Weapons Production Facility - Russia	\$2,000		
	Emerging Chemical Weapons Destruction Requirements		\$1,000	\$3,000
Nuclear W	eapons Storage Security	\$16,210	\$22,090	\$9,614
	Site Security Enhancements - Russia	\$7,728	\$3,605	\$3,365
	Security Assessment and Training Center - Russia	\$8,482	\$18,485	\$6,249
Nuclear W	eapons Transportation Security	\$58,800	\$45,867	\$45,000
	Nuclear Weapons Transportation - Russia	\$19,487	\$18,126	\$26,534
	Railcar Maintenance and Procurement - Russia	\$39,313	\$27,741	\$18,466
Biological	Threat Reduction	\$177,463	\$152,132	\$209,034
	Biosecurity, Biosafety, Threat Agent Detection and Response	\$171,747	\$133,255	\$184,746
	Cooperative Biological Research	\$5,716	\$18,877	\$24,288
WMD Prol	iferation Prevention Initiative	\$69,286	\$83,886	\$79,821
	Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention - Ukraine	\$21,657	\$27,262	\$26,527
	Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation Prevention - Azerbaijan	\$6,016		
	Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention - Kazakhstan	\$41,613	\$50,052	\$53,126
	Expanded Proliferation Prevention		\$6,572	\$168
Global Nu	clear Lockdown			\$74,471
	Spent Naval Fuel/Fissile Material Disposition - Russia			\$16,571
	Site Security Enhancements - Russia			\$11,500
	Automated Inventory Control and Management System - Russia			\$16,400
	Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence			\$30,000
Defense a	nd Military Contacts	\$8,000	\$5,000	\$5,000
	Defense and Military Contacts	\$8,000	\$5,000	\$5,000
New Initia	tives	\$10,000	\$17,000	
	New Initiatives	\$10,000	\$17,000	
Other Ass	essments/Administrative Support	\$20,100	\$21,400	\$23,040
	Audits and Examinations	\$500	\$500	\$500
	Program Management/Administration	\$19,600	\$20,900	\$22,540
CTR Progr	ram Total	\$433,244	\$423,560	\$522,512

III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands):

FY 2010 Congressional Action FY 2009 Budget Appro-Current FY 2011 A. BA Subactivities Amount Percent priated Actuals Request Estimate Estimate 1. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination 38,985 66,385 66,385 66,385 66,732 2. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination 6,400 6,800 6,800 6,800 6,800 3. Chemical Weapons Destruction 28,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 4. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security 16,210 15,090 15,090 22,090 9,614 5. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security 58,800 46,400 -533 -1 45,867 45,867 45,000 6. Biological Threat Reduction 177,463 152,132 152,132 152,132 209,034 7. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative 69,286 90,886 90,886 83,886 79,821 8. Global Nuclear Lockdown 74,471 9. Defense and Military Contacts 8,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 10. New Initiatives 10,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 11. Other Assessments/Administrative Support 20,100 21,400 21,400 21,400 23,040 Total 433,244 404,093 19,467 423,560 423,560 522,512

CTR did not receive FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental or Bridge funding.

B. Reconciliation Summary:	Change FY 2010/2010	Change FY 2010/2011
Baseline Funding	404,093	423,560
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	20,000	_
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	_	_
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent	_	_
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	-533	_
Subtotal Appropriated Amount		423,560
Fact-of-Life Changes (CY to CY Only)	_	_
Subtotal Baseline Funding	423,560	423,560
Anticipated Wartime Supplemental	_	_
Reprogrammings	_	_
Price Changes	_	5,930
Functional Transfers	_	_
Program Changes	_	93,022
Current Estimate	423,560	522,512
Less: Wartime Supplemental	-	_
Normalized Current Estimate	423,560	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY 2010 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)		404,093
1. Congressional Adjustments		19,467
a. Distributed Adjustments	20,000	
b. Undistributed Adjustments		
c. Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent		
d. General Provisions- Sec 8097 - Economic Assumptions	-533	
e. Congressional Earmarks - Indian Lands Environmental Impact		
FY 2010 Appropriated Amount		423,560
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
3. Fact of Life Changes		
FY 2010 Baseline Funding		423,560
4. Reprogrammings (requiring 1415 Actions)		
Revised FY 2010 Estimate		423,560
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
FY 2010 Normalized Current Estimate		423,560
6. Price Change		5 , 930
7. Functional Transfers		
8. Program Increases		130,345
a. Annualization of New FY 2010 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2011 Increases		
c. Program Growth in FY 2011		
1) Biological Threat Reduction (FY 2010 Base: \$152,132). Provides		
additional funding for CRL construction in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.	54,534	
2) Global Nuclear Lockdown (FY 2010 Base \$0). Supports securing	-	
vulnerable fissile material by the end of 2012.	74,471	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
3) Other Assessments/Administrative Support. Funds additional		
support costs associated with the Defense Threat Reduction Embassy		
Offices in partner countries (FY 2010 Base: \$21,400).	1,340	
9. Program Decreases		-37 , 323
a. Annualization of FY 2010 Program Decreases		
b. One-Time FY 2011 Increases		
c. Program Decreases in FY 2011		
1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination. Reduction in SS-N-20		
eliminations (FY 2010 Base: \$66,385).	-582	
2) Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination. Storage facilities and		
utilities costs decrease (FY 2010 Base: \$6,800).	-95	
3) Chemical Weapons Destruction (FY 2010 Base: \$3,000). Construction		
of CWDF in Russia completed.	-42	
4) Nuclear Weapons Storage Security. SATC construction completed (FY		
2010 Base: \$22,090).	-12 , 786	
5) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security. Cargo railcar	1 500	
procurement completed (FY 2010 Base: \$45,867).	-1,509	
6) WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative. Decreased funding for		
Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention (FY 2010	F 020	
Base: \$83,886).	-5 , 239	
7) Defense and Military Contacts. Up to 2 fewer defense and military	7.0	
exchanges (FY 2010 Base: \$5,000).	-70	
8) New Initiatives. No additional funding until additional	17 000	
refinement of this activity is complete (FY 2010 Base: \$17,000).	-17 , 000	

C.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY	2011 Budget Request		522,512

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

The CTR Program was identified in 2006 as one of the DoD programs to participate in the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a diagnostic tool used to assess the performance of Federal programs. The Office of Management and Budget concurred with the DoD Assessment Rating of "Effective" for the CTR Program, the highest rating achievable under PART. To achieve maximum effectiveness and greatest efficiency, the CTR Program requires cooperation on common objectives from partner countries receiving assistance. The CTR Program's flexibility in program management and acquisition strategy enables it to target its efforts on the most cooperative partner countries. The full PART review can be viewed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.

The CTR Program annual targets for performance measures are presented in the table below. The table represents many of the programs and activities but is not inclusive. Summary accomplishments/targets for the prior years and the full FYDP period can be found in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to the Congress FY 2011.

CTR PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANNUAL TARGETS						
Calendar Year	2009	2010	2011			
WMD Means of Delivery Elimination	60	126	177			
Cumulative Eliminations	3,720	3,846	4,023			
New Railcars to Transport Nuclear Weapons	18	18	18			
Cumulative Railcar Deliveries	47	65	83			
Biological Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories	3	13	5			
Cumulative	19	32	37			

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 38,985 66,385 66,732

A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination</u>:

FY 2009 funds: Eliminate 2 SS-18 ICBMs and 8 SS-19 ICBMs; Decommission 6 and dismantle 21 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs; Eliminate 10 SS-25 ICBMs; Eliminate 30 SS-25 road-mobile launchers; Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments; Dismantle 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers: Conduct repairs at the liquid propellant ICBM elimination facility; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support. FY 2010 funds will: Eliminate 8 SS-19 ICBMs; Dismantle 9 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs: Decommission 10 and dismantle 11 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs: Eliminate 11 SS-N-20 SLBMs; Eliminate 30 SS-25 ICBMs; Eliminate 30 SS-25 road-mobile launchers; Initiate dismantlement of 1 Typhoon-class SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers; Dismantle 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers; Conduct repairs at liquid propellant ICBM elimination facility; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2011 funds will:

Eliminate 8 SS-19 ICBMs;

Decommission 20, dismantle 22, and eliminate 33 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

Eliminate 40 SS-25 ICBMs;

Eliminate 36 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;

Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;

Complete dismantlement of 1 Typhoon-class SSBN; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 6,400 6,800 6,800

B. <u>Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination</u>:

FY 2009 funds:

Store 160 SS-24 SRMs;

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility;

Assist Ukraine by making payments for 10 empty SRM cases;

Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and

Provide administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Store 156 SS-24 SRMs;

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility;

Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases;

Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and

Provide administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2011 funds will:

Store 105 SS-24 SRMs;

Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility;
Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases;
Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
Provide administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 28,000 3,000 3,000

C. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

FY 2009 funds:

Provide technical support of CWDF operations to destroy chemical weapons and other CWD activities in Russia.

FY 2010 and FY 2011 funds will: Support emerging CWD requirements.

> (\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 16,210 22,090 9,614

D. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security:

FY 2009 funds:

Continue sustainment for 19 nuclear weapons storage sites, 5 Rail Transfer Points (RTPs) and 2 regional centers (Security Assessment and Training Center [SATC] and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Far East Training Center [FETC]) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

Initiate design and construction to expand the regional training and sustainment center at the SATC; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Continue sustainment for 19 nuclear weapons storage sites, (on site sustainment costs are transitioning to MOD-R) 5 RTPs, and 2 regional centers (SATC FETC) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

Continue construction to expand the SATC; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2011 funds will:

Continue sustainment for 19 nuclear weapons storage sites, (on site sustainment costs are transitioning to MOD-R) 5 RTPs, and 2 regional centers (SATC FETC) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

Complete construction at the SATC; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 58,800 45,867 45,000

E. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security:

FY 2009 funds:

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities and from storage to dismantlement;

Procure 31 additional cargo railcars;

Retrofit 7 DoD-provided quard railcars with RCSS;

Provide 14 satellite communication transmitters and antennas as part of an off-train communications and monitoring system;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Transport approximately 42 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;

Procure 10 additional cargo railcars;

Retrofit 3 DoD provided guard railcars with RCSS;

Develop and implement a sustainment program for including training, maintenance, and sparing;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2011 funds will:

Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Complete a sustainment program for RCSS including training, maintenance, and sparing;

Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 177,463 152,132 209,034

F. Biological Threat Reduction:

FY 2009 funds:

Provide for 14 CBR projects (4 in Azerbaijan, 3 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, and 3 in Ukraine);

Complete initial assessment of Armenian BTRP requirements;

Provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, biosafety bioethics/nonproliferation;

Continue to develop and deploy EIDSS in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan;

Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: complete construction of 1 CRL in Georgia, continue construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, enhance security at a central veterinary facility in Russia, renovate an interim CRL in Ukraine, and perform design adaptation for 1 permanent CRL in Ukraine;

Establish 11 ZDLs (9 in Azerbaijan, 1 in Georgia and 1 in Uzbekistan);

Sustain 23 ZDLs (2 in Azerbaijan, 5 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 2 in Ukraine, and 10 in Uzbekistan);

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

Provide the Russian International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2010 funds will:

Provide for 15 CBR projects (3 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Armenia, 2 in Georgia, 3 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Ukraine, and 2 in Uzbekistan);

Implement initial biosecurity, biosafety, and training enhancements in Armenia;

Provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety bioethics/nonproliferation;

Continue to develop and deploy EIDSS in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan;

Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, begin construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, complete 2 repository upgrades in Kazakhstan, complete 1 repository upgrade in Russia, and Commission 1 CRL in Georgia;

Establish 6 ZDLs (3 in Armenia, 1 in Georgia and 2 in Uzbekistan);

Sustain 34 ZDLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 2 in Ukraine, and 11 in Uzbekistan) and 1 CRL in Georgia;

Initiate Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) pilot project with Russian Ministry of Agriculture;

Provide the Russian ISTC with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2011 funds will:

- Provide for 20 CBR projects (1 in Pakistan, 3 in Azerbaijan, 4 in Armenia, 2 in Georgia, 3 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Ukraine, and 4 in Uzbekistan);
- Initiate minimal biosecurity upgrades and develop a CBR program and implement projects in Pakistan and select areas of Asia and Africa;
- Provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety bioethics/nonproliferation;
- Continue to develop and deploy EIDSS in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and initiate EIDSS implementation in Pakistan and select areas of Asia and Africa;
- Continue construction and outfitting of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, continue construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, complete 1 repository upgrade in Russia, and continue construction of 1 CRL in Ukraine;
- Establish 4 ZDLs (3 in Ukraine and 1 in Uzbekistan);
- Sustain 40 ZDLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Armenia, 7 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Ukraine, and 13 in Uzbekistan) and 1 CRL in Georgia;
- Provide the Russian ISTC with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for BTRP projects; and
- Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 69,286 83,886 79,821

G. WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative:

FY 2009 through FY 2011 funds provide material and non-material solutions to improve WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous efforts and includes:

FY 2009 funds:

Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria border, the Black Sea/Sea of Azov border, and the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, continue project assessments and support efforts at state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS) and upgrade additional international and state POE and ICS;

Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;

Azerbaijan: Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Caspian Sea maritime border;

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

FY 2010 funds will:

Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria border, the Black Sea/Sea of Azov border, and the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, continue project assessments and support efforts at state POE and ICS and upgrade additional international and state POE and ICS;

Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site;

Extended Areas: Conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance the WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment of material and non-material solutions to identified capability gaps; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2011 funds will:

Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria border, continue project assessments and support efforts at state POE and ICS and upgrade additional international and state POE and ICS;

Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site;

Extended Areas: Conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance the WMD command and control, communications, surveillance,

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment of material and nonmaterial solutions to identified capability gaps; and Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011

74,471

H. Global Nuclear Lockdown:

FY 2011 will:

Secure nuclear materials considered weapons-usable. This includes consolidation of fissile materials (Spent Naval Fuel) removed from Russian Federation Submarines; proper disposition of these materials; fabrication of containers and railcars, and other measures to improve the security of these fissile materials;

Provide hardware and software for additional AICMS field facilities, training on the AICMS system, and one year of warranty support for AICMS;

Provide Small Arms Training Systems and other guard force support;

Renovate and equip a central nuclear storage site monitoring center;

Provide sustainment to include training, maintenance, and depot support at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites, a Unified Operations Center, and a technological refresh of the Center for Technological Diagnostics;

Provide Mobile Repair Vehicles and on site repair points to maintain installed physical protection systems at nuclear storage sites;

Provides for, in coordination with the Interagency, country/regional security "centers of excellence" outside the FSU; and

Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 8,000 5,000 5,000

I. Defense and Military Contacts:

FY 2009 funds approximately 248 defense and military exchanges. FY 2010 and FY 2011 funds will support specific relationship-building opportunities in new geographical areas.

(\$ in Thousands) <u>FY 2009</u> <u>FY 2010</u> <u>FY 2011</u> 10,000 17,000 0

J. New Initiatives:

FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds will:

Expand the CTR Program with countries outside the FSU that include Pakistan, Afghanistan, and select countries in Asia and Africa; and Conduct initial biological threat reduction assessments for new countries. Initiate cooperative biological research projects with scientists outside the FSU.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (Continued):

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011
20,100 21,400 23,040

K. Other Assessments/Administrative Cost:

FY 2009 through FY 2011 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds provide Embassy support for six DTRA/CTR offices within the FSU.

V. Personnel Summary: N/A

VI. OP32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in Thousands):

			Changes from FY 2009 / FY 2010			from FY FY 2011		
Line Item	Description	FY 2009 Estimate	Price Growth	Program Growth	FY 2010 Estimate	Price Growth	Program <u>Growth</u>	FY 2011 Estimate
308	Travel of Persons	3,848	42	-187	3,703	52	-42	3,713
399	Total Travel	3,848	42	-187	3,703	52	-42	3,713
920	Supplies and Material	5	0	-5	0	0	0	0
932	Management & Professional Support	10,085	111	2,452	12,648	177	9	12,834
934	Engineering Technical Services	35,403	389	-7,640	28,152	394	20	28,566
987	Other Intra-governmental Purchases	81,432	896	-42,440	39,888	558	1,115	41,561
998	Other Costs	302,471	3,328	33,370	339,169	4,749	91,920	435,838
999	Total Other Purchases	429,396	4,723	-14,262	419,857	5,878	93,064	518,799
9999	GRAND TOTAL	433,244	4,766	-14,450	423,560	5,930	93,022	522,512

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